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CHAPTER FOUR 
The President as Spiritual Leader: Pardons, 
Punishment, Forgiveness, Mercy, and Justice 
HENRY L. CHAMBERS, JR. 
A pardon is an act of grace .... 
-United States 1;, Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160 (1833) 
A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an indi-
vidual happening to possess power. 
-Biddle v. PeroJJich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) 
Introduction 
The Constitution of the United States empowers the president of the 
United States to curtail or eliminate punishment for actual or pos-
sible federal criminal wrongdoing by issuing pardons. 1 As the quotes 
that begin this chapter suggest, the nature of a presidential pardon is 
subject to dispute. A pardon can be thought to be an act of grace or an 
extension of the president's executive power to administer the criminal 
justice system, or something in between. 2 This chapter does not resolve 
the issue, but considers the nature of the pardon power while consid-
ering whether or how the president can or should exercise spiritual 
leadership through the use of the pardon power. 3 The pardon power, 
with its focus on punishment, provides the president the opportunity 
to exercise spiritual leadership where law, punishment, forgiveness, 
mercy, and justice rneet. 
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For the purposes of this chapter, spiritual leadership is defined as 
values-based leadership that focuses on the humanity and humanness of 
those who will be affected by a decision rather than on primarily seek-
ing to identify the best or most administratively sound decision that 
could be made.4 In the context of pardoning, spiritual leadership does 
not entail ignoring the proper administration of the law and should be 
exercised with due respect for the law. 5 Nonetheless, spiritual leader-
ship grounds the administration of the criminal justice system in the 
service of goals such as justice and compassion rather than merely in the 
service of just punishment as defined by the sentence the law autho-
rizes a defendant to receive.6 Spiritual leadership may be informed by 
religion, but it need not be religion based.7 It is fundamentally moral 
leadership that may or may not lean toward religion. The definition of 
spiritual leadership this chapter adopts could be refined, but need not 
be. The line between spiritual and nonspiritual leadership will never 
be crystal clear. The key is not whether one agrees with precisely how 
spiritual leadership is defined, but whether one agrees with the con-
siderations that this chapter suggests can and, at times, arguably should 
underlie the president's use of the pardon power. 
Considering whether the president ought to exercise spiritual leader-
ship may seem nonsensical. The president is the political leader of the 
United States and the chief executive of the federal government. The 
president exercises leadership, but may need to exercise spiritual leader-
ship no more than the chief executive of any large or significant orga-
nization. 8 More important, the president need not be trained in any 
way that would prepare him to provide spiritual leadership. Wisdom 
might suggest that the president seek spiritual guidance from others 
while leaving spiritual leadership to others as well. However, when 
President Abraham Lincoln summoned the better angels of our nature 
and spoke of malice toward none and charity toward all during his 
inaugural addresses, he spoke as more than just the president. A cen-
tury later, when President Lyndon Johnson called for equal civil rights, 
equal voting rights, and a war on poverty, he spoke not only as the 
president, but as the nation's conscience. As the leader of an ostensibly 
peaceful nation that has used armed force when it thought necessary, 
the president of the United States ought to understand and reflect the 
nation's spiritual and moral core.9 
As the leader of the United States, the president could be consid-
ered the most appropriate person in the country to provide spiritual 
leadership to the country. The Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution are two of the United States' foundational documents. 
TI-IE PRESIDENT AS SPIRITUAL LEADER 71 
Both documents have spiritual roots. The Declaration notes that the 
point of government is to facilitate the exercise of the rights that the 
Creator has given the people. The Preamble to the Constitution notes 
that the Constitution was established to "in order to form a more per-
fect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the 
common defence, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings 
ofliberty to ourselves and our posterity[.]" The head of the government 
created by the Constitution should be able to exercise secular spiritual 
leadership when performing the functions of government, even ifhe is 
not a spiritual leader. 111 In matters of punishment and pardon, war and 
peace, and life and death, spiritual decision making is appropriate if not 
necessary. Situations may arise where the president may wish to call on 
religious or spiritual leaders prior to making a decision. Not only may 
the president be required to call upon his own spirituality or morality 
in the course of performing his regular duties, he may be expected to 
justify his decisions in terms that suggest a recognition of the spiritual 
or moral dimension of a problem.11 At the least, the president ought to 
have the capacity to demonstrate spiritual leadership when necessary. 
This chapter considers the president's constitutional pardon power 
and what opportunities that power creates for the president to demon-
strate spiritual leadership. This chapter first outlines presidential power 
and the parameters of the pardon power. Then, it discusses how pardons 
relate to punishment and forgiveness. Last, it considers how the presi-
dent can use the pardon pow~r to demonstrate spiritual leadership. 
The Presidency 
The powers of the president of the United States are not structured to 
guarantee or forestall spiritual leadership. The Constitution vests the 
executive power of the United States in the president, but does not 
define what executive power is. 12 The president takes an oath of office 
requiring that he swear or affirm that he "will faithfully execute the 
Office of President of the United States" and "will preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States," but the Constitution 
does not explain how the president is supposed to do that. 13 Though 
the president is the chief executive of the federal government, the presi-
dency requires no special training or skills. Natural born citizens who 
are at least 35 years old and have been residents of the United States for 
14 years are eligible to serve as president.14 The dearth of textual con-
straints on the president's exercise of power suggests that the president 
/ 
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is generally free to style the presidency as the president wishes. That 
provides the president significant latitude to exercise spiritual leader-
ship in using the powers of the presidency or not. 
Specijlc Powers of the Presidency 
In addition to assigning the president the executive power of the 
United States, the Constitution provides the president specific pow-
ers and responsibilities that help illuminate the breadth and content of 
the president's function. For example, the president is directed to take 
care that the laws of the United States are faithfully executed, 15 serves 
as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and may veto legisla-
tion subject to the possibility of a congressional override of the veto.16 
However, the Constitution does not explain how those powers and 
responsibilities should be exercised, save in the service of preserving, 
protecting, and defending the Constitution. As with the general execu-
tive power, the president is not much constrained by textual limitations 
on the aforementioned powers. The Supreme Court may divine con-
stitutional limits to presidential power, but such limits tend to be based 
on the interpretation of structural constitutional limits rather than on 
explicit textual commands.17 
The "take care" power is related to the executive power, but its 
contours are unclear. 18 The take-care power necessarily provides the 
president the latitude to interpret statutes and determine how best to 
implement legislation; it does not tell the president how to interpret 
laws for the purpose of executing them. The president may not interpret 
laws so aggressively as to functionally legislate, as the legislative power 
of the United States has been granted to Congress. 19 Other than that, 
textual limits on the president's take-care power are few. As important, 
the Constitution does not tell the president whether he should take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed for the spiritual or moral good of 
the tountry or for other reasons. 
Though the contours of the commander-in-chief power seem 
clearer than the contours of the take-care power, that clarity may be 
illusory. Whether the commander-in-chief provision merely guaran-
tees civilian control of the rnilitary or demands that the president have 
day-to-day control over the military is unclear from the Constitution's 
text. Similarly, the commander-in-chief clause appears to provide the 
president broad powers to adrninister the armed forces and to pros-
ecute war, but does not tell the president how to do so. 20 Though the 
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commander-in-chief power has a moral dimension in times of war, the 
power arguably can be exercised strictly administratively or amorally 
in times of peace. 
The Constitution gives the president the power to veto legislation, 
but does not explain why the president has the veto power or how it 
should be exercised. 21 The president can veto legislation that the presi-
dent believes is unconstitutional or that the president does not think is 
good for the country or that the president does not like. However, those 
reasons are not equally justifiable. The president may have a moral obli-
gation to veto legislation the president believes to be unconstitutional 
if the president's oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution 
is to have meaning. If the president believes legislation is bad for the 
country, consistent with the president's obligation to serve the country, 
the president arguably has a responsibility to veto the legislation. The 
president has the power to veto legislation based on mere personal dis-
like for the legislation though the president believes the legislation to 
be good for the country, but has relatively little justification for doing 
so. The Constitution appears to allow the president to exercise veto 
power whenever and however the president wants, in service of higher 
purposes or lower purposes. 
The Constitution does not explain how the president should take 
care that the laws are faithfully executed or how the president should 
discharge his commander-in-chief responsibilities or when the presi-
dent should veto legislation. It does not indicate whether the president 
should exercise spiritual leadership when discharging those duties. The 
lack of detail suggests that these powers need not be exercised in any 
particular fashion, leaving the president to decide whether to exerci~e 
them consistent with administrative efficiency or spiritual leaderslnp 
or both. The same appears to apply to the pardon power. However, the 
pardon power may implicate morality and spirituality more directly 
than the presidential powers mentioned above. That may suggest 
that a president's decision to consider or decline to consider spiritual 
leadership when exercising the pardon power may itself have a moral 
dimension. 
The Pardon Power 
The Constitution empowers the president "to grant reprieves and 
pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of 
impeachment."22 This allows the president broad power to eliminate 
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the possibility of punishment for criminal offenses against the United 
States and to commute and nullify sentences for convictions for crimi-
nal offenses against the United States. 23 A pardon can be thought to 
be an exercise of preemptive or post-hoc prosecutorial discretion that 
is consistent with the use of executive power to administer the crimi-
nal justice system or the pardon power can be thought to operate in 
derogation of law. 24 That the pardon power is largely unfettered and 
unchecked and is exercised solely by the president does not clarify its 
nature. 25 Various eighteenth-century political thinkers, including some 
of the Constitution's framers, worried about the nature of pardoning. 26 
Concern that the presidential pardon power may be antidernocratic 
and monarchical27 is unsurprising given that, though pardoning is an 
ancient practice, the Constitution's pardon power is drawn frorn the 
royal prerogative of English monarchs. 28 Nonetheless, the presidential 
pardon power must be exercised consistent with democratic principles 
and with the Constitution's recognition that the citizenry, not the pres-
ident, is the sovereign. 29 
The pardon power can be exercised in five ways. 311 The president can 
issue a full pardon that reverses a conviction or forestalls the possibil-
ity of prosecution. For example, President Ford's pardon of President 
Nixon eliminated the possibility of Nixon's prosecution. 31 The presi-
dent can truncate punishment by commuting a sentence. The president 
can reverse fines and forfeitures. The president can grant a reprieve 
to postpone punishment to allow the justice system to reconsider its 
decision or for other reasons. Finally, the president can grant amnesty, 
which typically focuses on a group and is aimed at not prosecuting a 
particular crime rather than a particular person. The Civil War and 
post-Civil War pardons of Confederates amounted to an amnesty. 32 
The use of the pardon power in the various manners mentioned above, 
as a way of regulating the criminal justice system, makes it a legitimate 
part of the democratic republic rather than a monarchical power held 
over from the colonial era. 33 
Pardoning can serve many different functions. A pardon can be an 
act of grace limited only by the executive's standard of mercy that is 
exercised for the benefit of the pardoned. 34 A compassionate pardon 
that allows release so a prisoner can die at home might qualify as an act 
of grace. A pardon can be a discretionary act by the executive limiting 
punishment to guarantee that punishment carried out in the name of 
the citizenry is fair and proportional rather than too harsh and mtjust. 
A pardon can be a purely adrninistrative act when the justice system 
needs to be corrected by its ultimate administrator, for example, when 
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a wrongfully convicted prisoner is pardoned. A pardon can be given to 
end the specter of prosecution when such prosecution is thought to be 
potentially bad for the country. Why the president issues a pardon is left 
to the president, as is whether the president exercises spiritual leader-
ship when issuing a pardon. 
The next section of this chapter considers how pardons relate to 
punishment and forgiveness as a prelude to considering whether and 
how the president can or should use the pardon power to demonstrate 
spiritual leadership. 
Punishment, Forgiveness, and Pardon 
Punishment, forgiveness, and pardon are often connected, and all can 
be related to spiritual leadership. Forgiveness can be a central justifica-
tion for lessening a punishment or it can be tangential to punishment. 
A pardon often relates to ending or negating punishment, but may also 
be granted after punishment-in the form of a criminal sentence-has 
been fully served. How punishment, forgiveness, and pardon are related / 
is important. Their interrelatedness allows the president to demonstrate 
spiritual leadership when exercising the pardon power. In this context, 
spiritual leadership may require that the president recognize that an 
offender is not merely an abstraction to be punished or acted on, but 
that the offender should be treated with humanity and dignity even 
though his or her actions were criminal. 
Punish111e11t and lvlercy 
Criminal punishment is the state-sanctioned negative treatment of an 
individual in response to criminal wrongdoing. It reflects society's moral 
outrage in response to the crime. The harsher the crime the more seri-
ous the outrage and the harsher the punishment given. 35 Punishment 
can take several forms, including death, incarceration, probation, and 
fine. 36 Punishment can be justified by retribution, ostensibly because the 
criminal deserves the punishment, or it can be justified by utilitarian rea-
sons, such as incapacitation, deterrence, or rehabilitation. 37 Even when 
authorized by the criminal justice system, punishment can be considered 
a wrong that must be justified. 38 The punishment ought to be justified 
when the sentence is announced and as the sentence is served. 
Mercy is a grant of leniency for the punishment that the law allows 
or requires that the criminal receive, such as a mandatory minimum 
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sentence for a particular crime, or deems the criminal to deserve. 39 
Justifications for mercy are varied. The circumstances surrounding a 
particular crime, including the reasons the wrongdoer may have had 
for commiting the crime, may be such that an appropriate punish-
ment would appear to be less punishment than the law requires. Mercy 
rnight seem appropriate at sentencing, even though mercy may be pro-
hibited at sentencing. In addition, as a prisoner serves a sentence, cir-
cumstances may arise or factors may be uncovered that would appear 
to make continued punishment unnecessary though continued punish-
ment is authorized or mandated by law. Under those circmnstances, 
mercy may be sensible though it is never required. 
Forgiveness 
Forgiveness can be related to, but is more complex than, punishment or 
mercy. It has multiple meanings. 411 For example, forgiveness can entail 
foregoing what is owed, such as forgiving a debt, or it can focus on how 
a victim processes the harm a transgressor has caused. 41 This chapter 
focuses on the latter conception. Though precision may obscure as much 
as clarify, a working definition of forgiveness is useful.'12 Forgiveness is 
the abandonment of the ill will or ill feelings that a victim may reason-
ably feel toward a transgressor as a result of being hanned. 43 
The nature of forgiveness is tricky. Though some suggest that forgive-
ness is supposed to involve getting past or getting over a harm, forgive-
ness is not about forgetting or ignoring the harm.44 Forgiveness is as much 
about remembering with a purpose as it is about forgetting.45 Rather than 
focusing merely on pushing through the harm a transgressor has caused, 
forgiveness is about recognizing the harm that has been caused while 
understanding that the past should not imprison the victim.46 Forgiveness 
requires remembering, but without rancor or resentment. 47 
Forgiveness has not always been a commonplace practice and it is 
not a timeless concept. Indeed, it was not considered a classical vir-
tue. 48 The modern concept of forgiveness may not have been invented 
by Jesus of Nazareth, but it has been given significant life through 
his teachings. 49 However, forgiveness need not be religious. 511 Though 
some may suggest that forgiveness is more easily understood when it 
has a religious basis, religiosity need not be a precursor to or justifica-
tion for forgiveness. 51 Secular forgiveness can be as important as reli-
gious forgiveness, particularly if religious forgiveness is considered too 
automatic and reflexive to be useful as an incentive for transgressors to 
correct their behavior. 52 
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What forgiveness requires and, consequently, how easily forgiveness can 
occur is subject to debate. Forgiveness may be quite limited if it requires 
that a transgressor seek forgiveness from a victim for a harm inflicted. 
The transgressor may not feel the need to be forgiven if the transgres-
sor does not believe he acted wrongfully. s:i The transgressor may not be 
remorseful even if he knows he committed the wrong. Lastly, even if 
the transgressor is remorseful and knows he was the wrongdoer, he may 
not wish to request forgiveness. Though limiting forgiveness to situations 
in which the transgressor requests forgiveness may seem sensible, if for-
giveness focuses on the injured person foregoing rancor and resentment 
regarding a past wrong, whether the transgressor seeks forgiveness may be 
irrelevant. 54 Forgiveness without a request for forgiveness may not serve to 
reconcile a wrong in any meaningful way; it may merely allow the victim 
to move on. Of course, forgiveness need not always lead to reconcilia-
tion. Though feelings of resentment dissipate when forgiveness is given, 
that alone does not ensure that the transgressor and victim will reconcile. 
Rather, they may merely no longer be openly hostile. 55 
A limitation on who can forgive may limit how often forgiveness 
occurs. Though an interpersonal vision of forgiveness that requires that 
the injured be willing to forgive and that the transgressor be willing to 
ask for forgiveness rnay appear to be the most traditional or authentic 
form of forgiveness, it is also quite limiting. 56 The victim appears to be 
the only person who can forgive the harm. Such a limitation may be 
problematic if forgiveness is to be the first step in encouraging a change 
in the transgressor. 
Though the power to forgive may be limited to victims, a transgres-
sion may have multiple vic;ims yielding multiple avenues for forgive-
ness. The transgressor's immediate victim can forgive. In addition, a 
form of forgiveness may come from someone who has been harmed by 
the transgression, but was not the primary victim of the harm. These 
secondary victirns can forgive the transgressor for the harm that was 
done to them. For example, a transgressor who harms my spouse has 
harmed me as well. I can forgive the wrongdoer for the hurt he caused 
me by harming my spouse. 57 This forgiveness is not complete, but may 
begin a process of change in the transgressor. 
The secondary victim may not be able to forgive the wrongdoer for 
the harm he did to the primary victim because the secondary victim rnay 
not have the authority to do so. 58 Allowing such third-party forgive-
ness on behalf of another is controversial and problematic. Nonetheless, 
some have argued that such forgiveness is appropriate when some form 
of authority to forgive has been passed to the third party by the victim 
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or could be reasonably assumed by the third party. 59 The circumstances 
under which that would be sensible appear few and very specific. 611 
In the absence of such circumstances, third-party forgiveness would 
appear to be just words spoken by someone without the authority to 
forgive, even if the circumstances were such that forgiveness should 
have been given. 61 Conversely, some argue that not only can third par-
ties forgive, but that groups can forgive.<'2 As noted below, who has the 
authority to forgive and what may be forgiven has important implica-
tions for forgiveness through presidential pardon. 
Forgiveness and Punishment 
Forgiveness docs not preclude punishrnent. Forgiveness relates to the 
victim's feelings toward the transgressor and the transgression and 
may depend on whether the transgressor has requested forgiveness. 
Punishment focuses on whether the transgressor should suffer a nega-
tive outcome because of the transgression. When punishment is based 
on retribution or just desert, the factors that may trigger forgiveness may 
be unrelated to the factors that trigger punishment.63 When punishment 
is based on utilitarian reasons, remorse and acceptance of wrongdoing 
by the transgressor that may precede a request for forgiveness may be 
relevant to the amount of punishment an offender should face. 64 
Mercy entails foregoing punishment that is authorized or deserved. 
Forgiveness and mercy are related, but forgiveness does not guarantee 
mercy. An offender can be forgiven, but be punished without mercy 
precisely because punishment is deserved. 65 Conversely, one can be 
given mercy, with punishment foregone, but not be forgiven for the 
wrongdoing that triggered the punishment. This is clear when the for-
giver and the punisher are different people or entities, such as, when 
a victim is the forgiver and the government is the punisher. However, 
even in an interpersonal relationship, such as a parent-child relation-
ship, where the parent may have the power to both punish and forgive, 
the forgiver need not be merciful. The parent's forgiveness does not 
always preclude the need for punishment, particularly if other children 
will be influenced by the lack of punishment.66 
Pardon and Punishment 
Punishrnent and pardon are inextricably linked. A pardon can end or 
eliminate the possibility of punishment; the refusal to grant a pardon 
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may extend punishment. Punishment is a wrong-consider the death 
penalty or imprisonlllent-though it can be beneficial, necessary, or 
justifiable. 67 Given that punishment is a wrong, it should be re-justified 
or re-justifiable each day that a wrongdoer is punished. An official's 
decision to eliminate punishment or possible punishment may have a 
spiritual dimension, one that focuses on the offender's humanity, if the 
official takes seriously the obligation to justify punishment each day 
it is given. Releasing a prisoner from serving the remainder of a sen-
tence that has been lawfully authorized may have a spiritual dimension. 
Barring new information about the crime, the discretionary decision 
to curtail a sentence usually should be based on the prisoner's transfor-
mation in response to punishment or some reason that suggests that a 
pardon would be for the good of the country or the judicial system. 
Refusing to pardon a prisoner and continuing to allow the prisoner 
to be punished may also have a moral or spiritual dimension. When 
punishment is provided for retributive purposes, that is, because the 
offender deserves to be punished, enforcing the punishment may carry 
a moral dimension. When the punishment is deserved, society may 
have an obligation to punish the offender fully. 68 Requiring that pun-
ishment be inflicted may affirm the victim's humanity by indicating 
that harm to the victim is worthy of the offender's continued punish-
ment. Conversely, when punishment is provided for purely utilitar-
ian purposes, whether an offender's punishment should or should not 
continue may become primarily an administrative matter. If societ,Y, 
through the legislature, has determined that punishment of a certam 
length will be given because punishment of that length will serve a 
penal purpose, forcing the prisoner to continue serving his sentence 
may not be a matter of spirituality or morality as much as a matter of 
confirming the certainty of punishment and wresting any additional 
utilitarian value from the punishment that may exist. 
Pardon and ForRilleness 
A pardon need not be premised on forgiveness, though it may be. 6'J A 
president can pardon in circumstances that do not suggest forgiveness. 
For example, President Ford's pardon of President Nixon did not sug-
gest forgiveness. It merely suggested that the country would not be well 
served by the prosecution of a former president.711 The same can be said 
of some arnnesties. The Civil War-era amnesty of former Confederates 
could be justified by a desire for the country to reconcile and move on 
after the war, but it may have been unrelated to forgiveness.71 
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Grounding pardons on forgiveness appears difficult because of probv-
lems related to third-party forgiveness. A pardon will often appear ti) 
entail third-party forgiveness. Indeed, even if a pardon is grounded 0\1 
beliefs regarding the changed nature of the prisoner's soul, the pard0\1 
would not seem to be based on traditional first-party, interpersori~J 
forgiveness.72 A presidential pardon and forgiveness would seem hopev-
lessly separate. The president could encourage the victim to forgiv~, 
but could not forgive on the victim's behalf. 
However, a pardon may reflect a type of forgiveness that echoC:O:; 
interpersonal forgiveness. A crime that has a victim is both an attack 0\1 
the victim and an attack on the sovereign, both the jurisdiction and it:; 
people.73 Indeed, given that presidential pardons apply to federal crime:; 
or offenses against the United States,74 the president may be able to for.-
give on behalf of the country for the harm the country suffered frot),1 
the commission of the crime.75 Indeed, arguably, no one other than the 
president is in the position to forgive a crime in a representative capac,.. 
ity, in the same way that no one other than the victim is in the position 
// to forgive the harm to the victim. The president cannot forgive for the 
harm a victim has suffered because of the act, but the president may be 
able to forgive for the harm that the country has suffered because ()f 
the crime. 
The style of forgiveness the president can give can be likened to 
political forgiveness discussed by Peter E. Digeser in his book Politic<tf 
Forgiveness. Political forgiveness focuses on what can be forgiven, by 
whom, and what that might mean for reconnecting a transgressor with 
the state. Political forgiveness bridges the concept of mere adrninistra-
tivc pardon and pardon that entails interpersonal forgiveness. Politic~! 
forgiveness allows a president to pardon and give real forgiveness from 
the state's perspective, but would not necessarily allow for the interper-
sonal forgiveness that the state lacks the standing to provide. Though 
political forgiveness is not interpersonal forgiveness, political forgive-
ness may encourage interpersonal forgiveness.7(' The president could 
justify political forgiveness with reference to spiritual forgiveness, b11t 
need not do so. 
The president has the power to pardon. That power arguably comes 
with the power to provide political forgiveness for the harm that crimi-
nal activity caused to the nation. That power could help reconcile the 
transgressor with the polity. The power to pardon docs not come with 
the power to provide interpersonal forgiveness on behalf of the victim 
of a crime, but it does come with the power to make a statement about 
punishment and demonstrate spiritual leadership. The last part of this 
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chapter considers whether and how the president should use the pardon 
power to exercise secular spiritual leadership. 
The President, Pardon, and Spiritual Leadership 
The president can demonstrate spiritual leadership focused on the 
humanness and humanity of offenders through the use of the pardon 
power. As the head of the federal criminal justice system, the president 
has ultirnate responsibility for punishment meted out by that system. 
Though recent presidents have used pardons sparingly and somewhat 
poorly, the president has the explicit power to cancel punishment and 
to attempt to reconcile offenders with society through the pardon 
power.77 As important, the president has the implicit power-through 
the Attorney General and the Department of Justice-to defer crimi-
nal prosecutions and effectively provide pre-emptive pardons without 
using the pardon power. Those tools allow the president to manage the 
punishment provided by the criminal justice system in a purely admin-
istrative fashion or to comment on how and why we punish, while 
demonstrating spiritual leadership in the process. 
When a pardon is used to block punishment for an offender's crimi-
nal activity or to provide amnesty to a group of people for commit-
ting a particular crime in a particular way, the president may signal 
that the prosecution of such cases is unjust as a matter of principle. 
The president must enforce the laws of the nation. However, when 
the enforcement of a particular law in a particular way may lead to an 
unjust result, pardon or amnesty may be appropriate.78 For example, 
some may consider prosecution for the use of medical marijuana under 
federal drug laws to be an unjust attempt to deny medicine to people. 
Prosecution of such cases would unquestionably be lawful, but may not 
be consistent with justice.79 When the enforcement of a law may lead to 
an unjust result, punishment may be legally justified but undeserved. A 
refusal to allow punishment for such a violation of the law through use 
of the pardon power is a commentary on what the president believes is 
right and wrong, just and unjust. That some crimes need not be pun-
ished, even when the criminaljustice system allows an offender to be 
punished, can be a powerful comment on why the government does or 
does not punish. 
The president can use the pardon power, in the form of a reprieve, 
to delay punishment. Delaying punishment is fundamentally differ-
ent than cancelling the punishment. Nonetheless, when a reprieve is 
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given to allow the justice system an additional opportunity to recon-
sider before punishment is rendered, the reprieve may serve the ends of 
justice, even ifthe punishment is reaffirmed and ultimately enforced. A 
reprieve may serve as a reminder that the United States does not punish 
until it is sure the punishment is deserved. 
Even when punishment is justified, the president can use the par-
don power to commute sentences when the president believes that an 
offender has been punished sufficiently. The use of the power to reverse 
fines and forfeitures can be justified in similar fashion. The president may 
determine that a sentence that was authorized by law and justified when 
given may not continue to be justifiable if continued punishment does 
not serve an appropriate penal purpose. When the prime justification 
for continued punishment is that the law authorized such punishment at 
some point in the past, the president could deem the use of the commuta-
tion power appropriate to end the punishment. That could be an irnpor-
tant comment by the president that punishment ought to be justified or 
justifiable every day that the sentence is carried out and that punishment 
must stop once it can no longer be justified, because an offender contin-
ues to be a human rather than an entity to be acted upon. 
How the president explains the use of the pardon power-which the 
president ought to do-may determine whether the president exercises 
spiritual leadership through its use. 811 The president can use the pardon 
power, in any of its manifestations, to call for societal reconciliation 
with offenders. 81 Such reconciliation with the polity could be facili-
tated regardless of the posture the pardoned offender may occupy-an 
offender who has served a full sentence or an offender who has yet 
to complete his sentence or an offender who has received amnesty. 82 
In circumstances where a conviction has led to the loss of political or 
civic rights, a pardon could be the first step toward the restoration of 
rights that might trigger reconciliation. Such a restoration would call 
for treating those who have been sufficiently punished for their wrong-
doing as full citizens again. 83 Eventually, that may lead to the public 
treating reengaged offenders in a way that might suggest forgiveness. 
That may be an exercise of spiritual leadership. 
The pardon power can be used to encourage interpersonal forgiveness 
by victims or to request forgiveness on behalf of the federal government. 
A well-reasoned pardon can suggest that extracting punishment may 
be secondary to the process of forgiveness and possible reconciliation. 
Though the pardon may, at best, provide for political reconciliation, 
it can encourage citizens to reexamine their own actions. A pardon 
may have no effect on the hearts or minds of the public, but it can 
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send a bold message of spiritual and political leadership. Conversely, the 
president can use the pardon power to ask for forgiveness for the federal 
prosecution of criminal activity when prosecuting such activity was 
patently unjust, though technically authorized by the United States. 84 
Such a pardon could act as an apology or a nonmonetary form of repa-
ration. A governmental request for forgiveness for engaging in actions 
that were authorized by law would be an act of spiritual leadership. 
Broadly, the president can use pardons, whether supported by forgive-
ness or mercy or not, to begin or sustain a national conversation about 
why we punish and how much we punish. Our traditional bases for 
punishment, particularly retribution, necessarily consider the spiritual 
and the individual. Even if the goal of the justice system is to provide 
an administrative structure that attempts to provide equal punishment 
for equal crimes, individualized justice may require consideration of 
spiritual issues. The president can note that spiritual considerations are 
relevant to how much punishment the offender deserves and how much 
punishment an offender needs to endure for society to have done its 
job of enforcing justice. Those issues can be spoken about in spiritual 
terms and those issues are at the core of how the president executes the 
pardon power that we the people as the sovereign in the United States 
have given to the office. 
Conclusion 
The president is the leader of the United States of America in whom 
many powers have been vested. Spiritual leadership is about recogniz-
ing the humanity in everyone-offender and victim-and using power 
to honor that humanity. As the chief administrator of a criminal justice 
system who wields the power to pardon, the president can and should 
demonstrate spiritual leadership when using the pardon power. The 
pardon power authorizes acts of grace and acts of justice through which 
a president can dernonstrate spiritual leadership. 85 A president may use 
the pardon power rarely, believing that the power should be used spar-
ingly. Nonetheless, when the president uses the power, the president 
should do so with due concern for the power's high purpose. 
The president ought to use the pardon power not only in a purely 
administrative fashion when necessary to correct errors in the judicial 
system, but also to dernonstrate spiritual leadership to begin a discus-
sion of the role of punishment in the federal criminal justice system. 86 
Pardons can illuminate what conduct the federal law criminalizes and 
' / 
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how much the system punishes such conduct. In addition, the pardon 
power provides an opportunity to consider the treatment of individ-
ual offenders who have served an appropriate sentence by question-
ing whether offenders should be forgiven for their crimes and in what 
manner they should be reconciled with society. All of these issues allow 
serious discussion of how to consider the humanity of offenders when 
punishing them, an issue at the heart of spiritual leadership. 
Though the president can choose whether or not to demonstrate spiri-
tual leadership, he should recognize that failure to use the pardon power 
may be an abdication of duty for which he could rightly be judged. 87 
The president has been given the pardon power in the shadow of a pre-
sumably well-functioning judicial system. The president's responsibil-
ity is to do right, as defined by the Constitution, for the benefit of the 
country using all of the tools at his disposal. Consequently, the president 
arguably has an obligation to use the pardon power for the good of the 
country in ways that suggest spiritual leadership. Unfortunately, if the 
last several presidents are guides, presidents will not exercise such lead-
ership through use of pardon power. If the citizenry wants the president 
to demonstrate secular spiritual leadership in this area, the citizenry may 
have to push the president in that direction. Of course, if the president 
decides to demonstrate serious spiritual leadership that tends toward 
maximum forgiveness, the citizenry should realize that such spiritual 
leadership may take the country past where it has historically been will-
ing to go in forgiving offenders and their criminal actions. 
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